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Introduction
Over the last decades, starting with Gordon Tullock's (1980) seminal contribution, contests have been intensely studied, not only in the economics literature but also in political sciences and other related fields. Contests have been used to model a wide array of situations of conflicts, ranging from inter-state conflicts (see e.g. Garfinkel (1990) ), over rent seeking (see e.g. Nitzan (1994) ), to promotion tournaments (see e.g. Lazear and Rosen (1981) ).
We start this paper with the observation that contests are often taking place between groups and, in the light of this observation, allow explicitly for the possibility that the members of these respective groups have differing valuations for the contested rent. This seems quite natural: If a group of producers tries to influence lawmakers to create favorable legislation, the value of this legislation is likely to be different for different group members.
As an example one might consider the market for agricultural products where the value of a specific legislation may vary greatly between large industrial farmers and small family run farms.
If we allow for this intra-group heterogeneity, there is a conflict of interests between different members of the group on how much resources to spend in the contest. We take a new perspective on this by taking into account the fact that typically not all the group members are actively participating in the contest, but typically groups assign delegates that act in the contest on behalf of the whole group. In analyzing this delegation problem we assume that the assigned representative will follow her preferences once she is in office. In this respect our analysis has very much the flavor of citizen candidate models a la Besley and Coate (1997) or Osborne and Slivinsky (1996) . We show that in our model the Median Voter Theorem is applicable. Thus the delegate's assignment can be modelled as the median voter's choice problem over different delegates' types.
Our set up allows us to analyze under what circumstances radical appointees come into power. The model predicts that in most situations of conflict 'tough' types will interact with 1 'weak' types and that it is rather unlikely that two opponents with the same degree of 'radicalization' meet. Initial differences in valuation between the median types in the respective groups are vastly amplified. The initially more 'radical' median voter delegates to a much more radical type whereas the initially less radical median voter accommodates by delegating less aggressively. As a result with delegation the amount of 'waste', i.e. unproductive effort spent in the contest, is generally lower than without delegation. Thus delegation can be, from a social planner's point of view, a desirable feature.
Though contests between groups have been analyzed before, the previous literature had a quite different take on the issue. Baik et al. (2001) look at a situation where two groups compete for a prize and each group member individually decides how much effort to exert in the contest. They find a mixed strategy equilibrium in which only the most 'radical' group member in the respective groups will be active in this situation. Konrad (2004) analyzes a fully discriminating contest 1 between two groups. After the prize has been allocated to one of the two groups, the members of the winning group internally have a contest to allocate the prize amongst themselves. The outcome depends on inter-and intra-group heterogeneity, and is not driven by free-rider incentives. Other than in our model it is not the median group member that is key to the results but the general heterogeneity within a group. 2 Also the issue of strategic delegation in the context of contests has been analyzed. Dixit (1987) shows that agents have locally an incentive to commit to exert higher effort in a contest. However he remains silent about how this commitment can work and points out that the specific channels of commitment should be analyzed in depth. We present one possible way to do this and offer a full analysis. Baik and Shogren (1992) build on Dixit 1 In a fully discriminating contest the contestant spending the most wins the prize with certainty. 2 Dijkstra (1998) and Schoonbeck (2004) also analyze situations of conflicts between groups. They base their analysis on the assumption that joint surplus is maximized. Schoonbeck (2004) focuses on the effect that with increasing group size it becomes more profitable to have just one agent acting in order to overcome the free rider problem in providing rent seeking effort within the group. Dijkstra (1998) makes strong assumptions on contractibility and focuses on the question how agents will support the acting agent in his efforts in the contest.
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(1987) and endogenize the order of moves. They can show that the "underdog" always wants to move first whilst the "leader" is happy to wait for his time to come. However, here we come to a different conclusion: In our framework both types would want to be the first mover. Baik and Kim (1997) analyze a model where the players in a contest can hire agents that are more 'able', i.e. who's effort in the contest has a higher return. These agents can be offered (exogenously given) incentive contracts. They find that there will be never delegation to a less able player. Although their results differ from ours qualitatively, the fact that the initially more radical player hires a more able agent is revocative of our result that the initially more 'radical' median delegates to a more radical representative.
Contests are closely related to all-pay-auctions
3
. But whilst all pay auctions are a special case of fully discriminating contests, we look at not-fully discriminating contests, i.e. the party spending more is not with certainty the winner. Konrad et al. (2004) analyzes delegation in first price all-pay auctions. In their model players can hire other agents to bid for them in the all-pay auction. The agents are incentivized with contracts and they find multiple asymmetric equilibria in this initially symmetric auction game.
The analysis of delegation problems has a long tradition in the political economy literature.
Agents often want to delegate certain actions to other agents that have preferences different to their own as the latter are able to commit to carry out certain actions at a future point in time. This logic is very similar to the one used in our argument. A prominent example of this literature is Gordon's(1983a, 1983b ) model of monetary policy. In their model a central banker faces a time inconsistency problem as his incentives are altered once the private sector has formed its expectations over future inflation. It turns out that the optimal solution is to delegate the monetary authority to a conservative and independent central banker who will never use monetary policy as a macroeconomic stimulus. Similar incentives work in capital taxation. Before capital is accumulated, politicians have an incentive to promise low tax rates. Once the capital is accumulated politicians have clear incentives to 3 Baye et al. (1993) and Hilman and Riley (1989) are examples of applying all-pay-auctions to lobbying.
3 tax the capital contrary to their past promises. Political economy equilibrium models show that medians voters find it optimal to delegate the taxation authority to a politician that possesses more wealth than they do as the wealthier person can commit more credibly not to overtax the capital 4 . Whilst in these two examples delegation is used to overcome a time inconsistency problem our model focuses on the strategic value of delegation in situations of conflict. Besley and Coate (2003) analyze centralized versus decentralized provision of public goods and show that for centralized public goods provision the delegates in the districts are strategically chosen such as to maximize the expected return from the negotiations on the federal level. This is close in spirit to Chari et al. (1997) who analyze the congressional split ticket voting behavior in the U.S.. They find that the states are more inclined to vote for democratic politicians to go to congress as they are expected to fight harder for transfers to the states from the federal government.
Our paper relates also to the game theoretic analysis of arms races. If one interprets the groups as nations, the resources as military expenditure and the rent as a foreign policy issue, our model can be seen as a model of arms races. We allow for this interpretation as we believe the model can explain in a simple way several features of arms races. For example Oren (1994) finds that the spending pattern of the conflicting parties in the Indo-Pakistani conflict over Kashmir matches the results of our model. High expenditures by one side are matched with low expenditures of the opponent. Oren (1992) finds the same feature in the US and USSR military spending during the cold war era.
Finally, there is a relation to the social psychology literature on group polarization. Social psychologists, cf. eg. Teger and Pruitt (1967) or Moscovici and Zavalloni (1969) , have found that group decisions are distorted towards the extreme with respect to the initial preferences, where the direction depends on the group members initial preferences. Our model could be applied to gain better understanding of the processes within groups that lead to this outcome. The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section two introduces the basics of the model. We then derive personal preferences over delegate's types and show that the median voter theorem can be applied. In section four we look at a simple version of the model where only one group has to appoint a member that carries out the contest activities.
This simplified version already gives us valuable insights into the mechanisms at work. In section five, we look at sequential delegation decisions, in section six the same is done for simultaneous delegation decisions with asymmetric and symmetric group medians respectively. In section seven we look at social welfare by comparing aggregate waste, i.e. total resources spent in the contest. Section eight discusses some extensions. Finally, we conclude in section nine.
Basic Model
To fix ideas consider two countries A and B that quarrel about a foreign policy issue. Assume this issue can be captured by a rent R. . As we stick to risk neutrality throughout one can interpret this not only as the winning probability but also as being the share the country secures for itself.
An individual citizen i's utility function in country A is given by
and the utility function for citizen j in country B is given by
This states that utility is increasing in the (expected) rent and decreasing in the resources spent by the country in the contest. This cost −m i with i = {A, B} can be considered as the foregone public good which is produced with a simple linear production function from the exogenously given budget b i with i = {A, B} not spent in the contest. Alternatively think of the contest expenditure financed by a equal per-capita-tax. We assume for now that the budget restrictions are never binding and neglect them in the course of this analysis. We will discuss these issues in our Extensions section where we also introduce heterogeneity in the cost of provision of the public good.
We proceed from here by first deriving the equilibrium of the contest stage dependent on the politician's types. Then we use our results to derive in the next section the citizens' preferences over politicians' types.
In the contest stage the two agents i (for country A) and j (for country B) in charge 6 maximize their utility by deciding upon m A and m B .
From the two first order conditions of this problem we can solve for the reaction functions 
They depend only on the politicians' types and on the size of the rent under consideration
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It will be useful in the further analysis of the model to note some properties of these equilibrium values. The equilibrium spending of a politician is strictly increasing in her own
It is increasing (decreasing) in the other politician's type if the politician is more (less) radical then the other politician. The problem of country A citizen i is given by
Using our results for m *
A and m * B from above the problem becomes
and we can solve for the reaction function
Inspecting the comparative statics we find that the optimal action increases in the citizen's
> 0 and decreases in the type of the other country's politician,
Thus we can clearly see that delegation decisions of the countries are strategic substitutes. This is an interesting observation in itself as it is in the analysis of contests seldomly the case that such a clear-cut case on strategic substitutability or complementarity can be made. 
Due to technical properties of the contest success function the country A citizen would like to delegate to a politician with a negative valuation for cases where he is confronted with a country B politician with a very low valuation (β
). As we restricted the type space to positive valuation types we can show that in all those cases the utility of citizen i is strictly increasing in α P (see Appendix 10.2) and thus he wants to delegate to the most radical type α. This leads to a vertical piece in the reaction function (see Figure 1) . Thus the reaction function is characterized by α
In order to analyze the delegation problem we proceed now by showing that in our context the Median Voter Theorem (MVT) is applicable.
Following Black (1948) we know that in any one dimensional policy problem the median voters most preferred policy choice will win any pairwise vote over any other policy candidate if the agents exhibit single peaked preferences over the policy choices.
First note that we deal with a one dimensional policy problem, as the question at hand is in the end what amount m A to spend in the contest. As we have shown above the decision how much to spend corresponds one to one to the decision which delegate to have in the contest.
Now for the Median Voter Theorem to be applicable we have to show single peakedness.
There is a one-to-one mapping from the spending decision to the type decision as any pair (m A , m B ) can be generated by choosing a pair of politicians α P , β P and the functions for m A and m B respectively are strictly increasing in the politician's type. Thus we focus only on the decision over types. Above we derived the reaction function in the delegate's type space for an arbitrary group member. Now we show that the utility has a unique peak on this reaction function for any group member for any given delegate type of the other group.
The optimal value of α P for an arbitrary country A citizen i is given by α
Thus we know that 
A closer inspection of this reaction function tells us more about when country a wants to delegate to more radical or less radical politicians. Here we already see the basic logic of delegation at work. Delegation leads to an amplification of initial differences which makes the actual contest more asymmetric. We will use the insights from this simple case in the analysis of what follows.
Sequential Delegation
Now we allow both countries to decide which citizen to send into the contest (two sided delegation). We first look at an analytically simpler situation in which country A has to appoint its politician before country B does. In what follows we refer to this case as sequential delegation.
We solve the problem by backwards induction and first have a look at country B 's problem where the median citizen has to decide upon delegation.
Using our results for m A and m B and deriving the first order condition we get the by now familiar expression for the optimal choice of β P * :
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Lemma 4 The best response function for β
M is given by β
Anticipating the behavior of the country B median and the behavior of the politicians the country A median faces the following optimization problem:
Using the equilibrium values of m * A , m * B and β P * , this becomes:
As can be seen easily, utility strictly increases in α P . Thus it is optimal to choose α P * = α.
This means that it is optimal for the country A median to delegate the negotiations to the most aggressive group member, irrespective of his relative aggressiveness as compared to country B's median.
Plugging this into β
M
's best response function we get β
Proposition 5 In the sequential move game the first mover chooses to delegate as radical as
possible α P * = α whereas the second mover accommodates β
. This result is independent of whether the first or the second moving median is more radical.
This result deserves some consideration for several reasons. First of all, it tells us that the result in the delegation case will be more pronounced then the one in standard contest models. While standard models of contests predict also asymmetric equilibria for symmetric players in a sequential situation, the model of delegation in contests predicts extremely asymmetric equilibria in its sequential version.
13 Second, the model gives us a clear prediction of the way in which the asymmetry works:
The country that is able to appoint a politician first has a first mover advantage as the appointment of a politician presents a fait accompli to the second country. Namely, the first country will use its first moving advantage in order to delegate to its most radical member, thereby making fighting for the rent more costly for the other group. Consequently, in equilibrium the share of the rent (and the utility for the median type) the first moving country can get will be significantly greater than the other country's share (see Appendix
10.3). This holds as long as α is sufficiently large, namely α > 2β
M . I.e., as long as delegation is a powerful instrument it ensures an advantage. The result is particularly striking for groups that are absolutely identical.
Note that our result that both countries prefer to have the first moving advantage contradicts Baik and Shogren's (1992) result that the 'underdog' (in our case the median of the country with the less aggressive median) wants to move first whilst the 'top dog' happily waits for its turn.
Simultaneous Delegation
We now look at the situation where the medians delegate simultaneously. Using the above derived equilibrium values of the final stage game we can solve for the best reply functions of the median types in the type space.
The problem of the median voter in countries A and B respectively is to choose a politician that will maximize their utility given her behavior in the final stage game
We can use the equilibrium values for m A and m B and derive the first order conditions and get again the equilibrium delegation functions in the politician type space:
2β M −α M < α and α P * = α otherwise for country A. an equilibrium in pure strategies. We will treat those cases separately.
Simultaneous Delegation -Asymmetry
We start with the generic case where countries' medians differ in their valuation, i.e. α 
. It is interesting that we get this result of extreme polarization independent of the difference in the median types, i.e. initially only marginal differences are drastically amplified and lead to very asymmetric equilibria. Note that standard models of contests predict asymmetric equilibria as well, if the contestants valuation of the rent is different. It is easy to show however that in our case the asymmetry will be more pronounced. Moreover, as one can see in Figure 3 , even minuscule variations in a country's (here country B s) median voter (and thus shifts in the reaction function) might lead to very dramatic changes in the Equilibrium (here from E to E ).
Note however, that the extreme nature of these equilibria depends on the restricted support for β P * ≤ β . If we allow for unbounded support this equilibrium seizes to exist and we do not find any pure strategy equilibrium (see Figure 4) . As the strategy set in this case is not compact we do not find a mixed strategy equilibrium, either. The intuition seems to be straightforward. Because no matter how far we push α out, the extremely asymmetric nature of the pure strategy equilibrium persists. The very moment we go to the limit of α → ∞ the nature of the (mixed strategy) equilibrium would change non-continuously. However, as the existence of an infinitely radical citizen seems to be not the empirically most relevant case we neglect this particularity in the remainder of the analysis and assume that there exist maximum types α and β. There is no a priori reason why one of these equilibria should have more appeal than the others but we can compare them with respect to the utility country A's median receives in them. From that we can see which equilibrium this agent would choose if he had the power to determine which equilibrium should be played. This result parallels the analysis of our sequential case where it was most desirable to be the first mover and delegate as extreme as possible. Thus it seems hardly surprising that in this case this type of equilibrium is preferred, too. welfare. In the analysis of contests social welfare is measured by the resources that are unproductively spent in the contest, i.e. the waste that is generated. We compare whether aggregate waste differs in a situation where delegation is possible as compared to a situation where the median type himself acts. The situation where the median voter acts himself is the relevant comparison as we know that the policy suggested by the median voter would win every election. We have shown above, that the Median Voter Theorem is applicable in our context. So without the possibility to delegate we know that always the median voter's most preferred policy would be implemented.
We show below that delegation has non-trivial effects on aggregate waste. This may imply interesting policy implications for designing optimal contests as a social planner interested in reducing the amount of resources spent in contests can try to design the structure of the contest such that groups are able or even forced to delegate.
Aggregate Waste with one-sided Delegation
We start with the situation where only one country, without loss of generality we again assume it is country A, can delegate. Aggregate waste in the case of no delegation,W nD , can be written as
From the equilibrium values for spending in the contest m *
2 and from the equilibrium values for the acting politicians, α
we can derive the aggregate waste in the case of delegation, W D , as
The difference in aggregate waste, ∆W = W nD − W D , can now be easily calculated.
We see that there is a reduction in aggregate waste whenever the country B median, who acts herself, is more radical. The intuition is that country A by delegating in this situation has the chance to back down and amplify the initial difference. By doing so the contest is more biased and less controversial. If however the country A median is initially more radical the difference is also more pronounced but the median in country B cannot back down by delegating downwards. Thus the controversy is worsened.
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Aggregate Waste with Sequential Delegation
Without loss of generality we again assume it is country A that delegates first. Recall from above that aggregate waste in the case of no delegation, W nD , can be written as
Using Again this result is due to the (by delegation extremely pronounced) asymmetry of the equilibrium.
Aggregate Waste with Simultaneous Delegation with symmetric Medians
Here we compare all equilibria with respect to the aggregate waste. To do so we again express which is constant over all equilibria. Intuitively, as there is no initial difference to be amplified delegation apparently looses its bite in the symmetric case.
Extensions
Heterogeneity with Respect to the Cost of Public Good Provision
Again looking at the median citizens' problems we can allow for differing efficiency c A and c B in providing the public good. A higher value for c A or c B expresses here a higher opportunity cost of resources spent in the contest as more of the public good consumption is foregone.
The analysis is basically the same as above and leads to equilibrium expenses in the contest given by
Using that we can solve for the best responses in the politician type space, again similar to above:
Now performing comparative statics with respect to the efficiency of public goods provision, c A and c B , leads us to conclude that an increase in the efficiency of public good provision, e.g. better developed infrastructure, leads to less radical delegation, i.e. an inward shift of the best response function, and thus has the same effect as a lower valuation of the median citizen:
2 < 0 and
Proposition 10 Better developed countries tend to delegate less radical. The following proposition summarizes these findings. The exact interpretation of these derivatives will differ depending on the specific application at hand. In some circumstances we can interpret this as countries competing for the group members with the strongest preferences for the rent. Suppose α > β, then country B has two advantages from attracting α. On the one hand β increases and on the other hand α M decreases. These two effects soften the conflict by amplifying the asymmetry and thus increase B s utility. 6 Where the first derivative, 
Group Composition
Financing of the Budget
We assumed so far that the spending in the contest is financed with an equal per capita tax.
Now suppose that the financing of the contest spending is done by a tax that increases in the citizen's valuation for the contested rent. In this situation delegating to a more radical politician loses its commitment power, as the more radical politician is less inclined to fight.
The reason is, that fighting hard for him is now relatively more expensive then for a less radical politician. As we have seen above the loss of delegation as an instrument may be even from a social planner's perspective be bad as aggregate waste increases. This might be one of the reasons why many policies are financed from a general budget and not on the basis of valuation dependent fees.
Budget Restrictions
We have argued above that spending in the contest strictly increases in the politician's type.
If we invert the argument we can state that delegation helps the median to commit to a certain level of spending. From this point of view a budget restriction has the same effect as the existence of a most radical type in a country.
We can distinguish between two cases. If the budget restriction of the less radical country is binding there is neither a qualitative nor a quantitative effect as this is as if the most radical type of this country is reduced. But in equilibrium this has no effect. Only if the budget is really low there may be a quantitative effect as the country has to back down even more then it initially intended. If the budget restriction of the more radical country is binding it is again as if the most radical type in this country is reduced. This has an immediate quantitative effect as the median can de facto not delegate as radical as he wants. There is also a qualitative effect as soon as the 'effective' most radical type is sufficiently small.
Then the initially less radical but richer country can exploit the fact that the more radical 25 but poor country cannot exercise its higher desire to win the contest. In this context Rajan and Zingales' (2000) finding that ex-ante (efficient) trades might not happen in the face of potential conflicts down the road has relevance also in our context. If a trade is mutually beneficial but might increase budgets sufficiently to spur conflict later on the fear from the fiercer contest to come might hinder trades from taking place.
Conclusion
This paper presented a model of delegation in contests. We have shown that the equilibria that tend to arise seem to be characterized by a high degree of asymmetry. This can be due to two factors. In the sequential game, the asymmetry was simply due to the first mover advantage in the delegation game. Using this advantage, the first moving group could secure itself a higher share of the expected rent. Even, in the simultaneous game asymmetry is almost certain to arise although for different reasons. Here we found that a median group member that is only slightly more radical than her opponent in the other group will decide to give the active role in the contest to its most radical and aggressive member. The other group's median accommodates by delegating to a rather moderate politician. Thus initial asymmetries are amplified by delegation. Further we showed that delegation in contests implies by its asymmetry that less resources will be spent in the contest than under nondelegation.
If one is willing to go some way in interpreting our model one could interpret the US electing the hawkish Ronald Reagan in 1981 being followed by dovish Mikhail Gorbachev coming into power in the USSR in 1985 as being consistent with the predictions of our sequential model. Next to this, admittedly anecdotal, evidence we would like to stress that the main implications of our model are in principle testable. Our model identifies not only the circumstances under which the median group member will be decisive, but although to whom he wants to delegate the decision and what resource spending in the contest this implies. Finally, our model predicts extremely asymmetric spending of both groups in the contest.
It appears to be that the reasoning applied in this paper can be fruitfully enriched and applied to other issues. As well in the field of public choice as in other fields such as Industrial 
Again we can derive the reaction functions in the politicians type space
which are qualitatively equivalent to our formulation. Thus our results hold for this more general formulation, too.
Derivation of the Reaction Function
Here we proof the optimality of delegating to α if β Left of the reaction function it holds that α P = k
Plugging this in gives sgn ∂u ∂α P = +1 for k < 1.
For β ∈ (0,
] we repeat the exercise:
Thus again we know that As utility is strictly increasing in α P it is optimal to choose in these cases α P = α.
Utility Comparison in the Sequential Move Game
Without loss of generality we assume that the country A politician moves first. From the analysis we know that α P * = α and β
29
The utility of the first mover is (after using our results on m A and m B ) given by
The utility of the second mover is (after using our results on m A and m B ) given by
Now use α P * = α and β P * = 
